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This year, 2018, marks the 10 year anniversary of the implementation of the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. It is, therefore, an appropriate time to review 
its effectiveness and consider whether the Act has achieved what it set out to. Its introduction 
was a parliamentary attempt to address the key defects’2 under the previous identification 
doctrine, where a company’s liability was dependant on gross negligent manslaughter being 
sought in the relevant directing mind and will. This article will highlight the inadequacies of the 
former regime and review to what extent the 2007 Act has resolved them. Importantly, it 
references the recent Grenfell Tower disaster, which, if corporate manslaughter charges are 
pursued, will be the Act’s biggest and most public challenge to date. 
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Companies, as a result of Salomon3, are ‘distinct and independent’4 entities separate from 
their members. However, in reality, ‘corporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, 
no thoughts, no desires’ and merely ‘help structure and facilitate the activities of human 
beings’. 5  Consequently, under the original common law models, corporate criminal liability 
had to be found in individuals and then ‘attributed’ to the company. Attribution in the UK, 
commonly takes two forms. The first, vicarious liability, imposes liability on corporations ‘for 
the criminal acts of employees…acting within the scope of their employment’.6 It is, ‘wholly 
derivative’.7 While the principle is easily applied, ‘a corporation is not…so abstract, impalpable 
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Agents,’ (1995), Loyola Law Review, vol.41, 279. 
7Minkes, J., and Minkes, L., Corporate and White Collar Crime, (2008), 64. 





or metaphysical that it cannot be regarded as a principal or master’,8 its scope is limited to 
strict liability offences. Accordingly, it contrasts with the majority of criminal offences which 
require mens rea to be established; an act does not make a person guilty unless the mind is 
guilty. The second rule of attribution, therefore, ‘requires…the identification of a human being 
who is liable for the crime’9 and which can be regarded as the company acting itself. 
Theoretically, ‘there [was] no conceptual difficulty in attributing a criminal state of mind to a 
corporation’,10 however, practically, the question ‘how can an inanimate, fictional entity such 
as a company act, and where is its state of mind to be located?’11 has proved elusive. It is the 
judicial and scholarly answers to this question, and more generally a review of the identification 
doctrine, that is of concern here.  
 
1  The Former Regime: Corporate Criminal Liability  
 
The identification doctrine  
The identification doctrine derives from a speech by Viscount Haldane LC in Lennard’s 
Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum co Ltd,12 where it was noted that:  
a corporation…has no mind of its own any more than it has a body of its own; its active 
and directing will must consequently be sought in…an agent…who is really…the very 
ego and centre of the…corporation’.13 
 
Though this is a civil case, it was affirmed in the criminal context, ‘with no divergence of 
approach’,14 in DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd;15 enabling corporations to be found 
liable for mens rea crimes. The issue with Lennard’s, is that it failed to ‘provide much guidance 
on…who comprised the alter ego of the corporation’,16 leading to the rather ambiguous view 
that, ‘the minds of those who control the company are the minds of the company itself’;17 the 
obvious question, being, who controls the company? Although, typically, the answer to the 
latter could be found by consulting the company’s constitution, ‘the test was not always so 
rigidly interpreted’.18   
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The test was revisited in HL Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v TJ Graham & Sons Ltd, where 
Denning LJ distinguished between a company’s  ‘…brain and nerve centre which controls 
what it does [and its] hands which hold the tools and act in accordance with direction from the 
centre’. 19 Those acting as the ‘brains’ of the company being treated, in law, as the company 
itself. Lord Denning’s segregation of ‘mere servants and agents’ and ‘directors and managers 
who represent the directing mind and will’, helped ‘redefine and unify the law’.20 However, ‘the 
anthropomorphism of likening a company to a human body’21 split opinion. Realist theorists like 
French agree that ‘corporations have a metaphysical-logical identity that does not reduce to a 
mere sum of human members’.22 In fact Stone even postulates that they are capable of both 
‘legal guilt and moral blame’.23 Realists argue that ‘it is…too easy to slip from thinking about a 
rule whereby conduct is attributed to a company… to characterising a company as a living, 
breathing entity’.24 The latter ‘limit[s] the role of corporate liability and renders sterile much of the 
argument about corporate structures’;25 what Hart labels the ‘metaphysical shadow’.26 It is 
therefore contended that Lord Denning’s definition of the ‘directing mind and will’ is flawed.  
 
Finally in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass,27 ‘a limit [as] to how far creative judges could 
stretch the test’28 was summoned. Their Lordship’s took different approaches to the rules of 
attribution. Lord Reid, found those who are ‘the embodiment of the company’ are the directing 
mind and will, such as ‘the board of directors, the managing director and perhaps other 
superior officers’ but not ‘their subordinates’.29  His Lordship took ‘an abstract, universal and 
non-context specific’ approach. Lord Diplock, in contrast, ‘gave the test a constitutional 
focus’,30 by finding the answer to who can legally be regarded as the company in the 
‘memorandum and articles of association’.31 Ultimately, their Lordships limited the 
identification doctrine so that it ‘stop[ped] at the boardroom’.32 After Tesco, ‘holding a company 
liable for crimes…transfigured into a question of…whether the board of directors…could be 
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held responsible for that particular activity’.33 Though this may serve well in prosecuting 
smaller corporations with de jure management structures, it is ‘manifestly at odds with…the 
diffusion of managerial power in large companies’.34 Not only does it ‘unfairly prejudice small 
companies with identifiable designated responsibilities’,35 but also ‘establishes a blueprint for 
corporate officials who seek to insulate their companies from criminal liability’.36 Since larger 
corporations are more likely to be the subject of criminal proceedings, Gobert contends, that 
‘it propounds a theory of corporate liability which works best in cases where it is needed least 
and works least in cases where it is needed most’.37  
 
Clearly, the identification doctrine ‘do[es] not make for a rational scheme of liability’38 unfairly 
allowing medium and large corporations to escape conviction by requiring the prosecution to 
‘lay the crime at the feet’39 of a single directing mind and will. More importantly it fails to define 
why corporations should be liable for culpable crimes. As Colvin states: ‘What does it mean 
to say that a corporation is at fault?’40 Accordingly, it has been argued, that ‘the common law 
has proved unsuited to this task’;41 its development simply resulting in a ‘period of intense 
confusion’.42 The courts ‘remained wedded’ to this approach, ‘prov[ing] unable to develop a 
model of liability which reflects the unique nature of the corporate defendant’. 43 That is, until 
the 1990s, which for some was a significant turning point.  
 
The Special Attribution test  
Such turning point can be pinpointed to Lord Hoffmann’s judgments, in El Ajou44 and 
Meridian.45 In the former case, a company’s chairman with no managerial power, was 
nevertheless found to be the directing mind and will. The case, illustrated ‘a relatively flexible 
interpretation of the directing mind and will test’,46 focusing more on the context, rather than 
                                                     
33 Anchayli, A., ‘The ‘directing mind and will’ test in corporate attribution: Iridium and Meridian – a 
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the hierarchy of the offending person. This ‘gave a hint as to what was to come later in 
Meridian’ where his Lordship’s judgment was ‘strikingly bolder’,47 fashioning a “special rule” of 
attribution, to be adopted when the general rules of agency and primary rules of attribution 
were insufficient. It took a ‘context sensitive, purposive…approach’,48 requiring the court to 
apply the ‘usual canons of interpretation’49 having regard to the substantive law’s language, 
content and policy when determining corporate liability. In essence, this contextual approach 
meant that the ‘directing mind [could]…be found outside [of] executive positions’.50 A point 
recognised by Sealy, who commended Meridian’s introduction of ‘flexibility into a difficult area 
of the law’.51 
 
For some, Meridian ‘relegated the directing mind theory…to the side-lines’52 and was a 
‘comprehensive and bold attempt to rescue the law…from the confusing mire it had fallen 
into’.53 Its potential ‘widening of the…scope for criminal prosecutions’,54 was welcomed in a 
growing blameworthy society. For others, it was merely a ‘reinterpretation of the identification 
doctrine’;55 at most it ‘added another layer’.56 Payne notes that ‘it is not possible to provide a 
precise answer to…whose acts and knowledge will be attributed to the company since the 
analysis depends on the particular rule and context in question’.57 Perhaps why the judiciary 
continued to resort to the orthodox “directing mind and will” test.58 Ultimately, Cooke was 
correct in saying that ‘anthropomorphism [is] very hard to eradicate from this branch of law’.59  
 
The disasters leading to the CMCHA 2007 
The adverse effects of the identification doctrine were magnified in the high profile disasters 
throughout the 1980s-90s. Despite significant fatalities, the picture that emerged was one of 
‘failed prosecutions and – crucially – the failure to bring prosecutions because of anticipated 
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problems of proof’.60 Shockingly, out of nine disasters, four resulted in corporate manslaughter 
proceedings but only one was successfully prosecuted - P&O European Ferries61- important, 
because it reiterated ‘the legal possibility that a corporate body is capable of manslaughter’.62 
The prosecution failed because no individual senior manager could be identified as the 
directing mind and will giving an early indication that ‘the larger the company, the more likely 
it will be to avoid liability’.63 This is exacerbated in R v Kite,64 the first successful corporate 
manslaughter prosecution, it involved a small one-man company where ‘the managing director 
was obviously the directing mind and will’.65 It should not, therefore, be seen as a ‘ground-
breaking development’, but rather a further example of the ‘inability of the law…to bring to 
account those corporate bodies’ that are the most dangerous. 66 What Tombs and Whyte refer 
to as a ‘glaring irony’.  
 
This early indication was brought into reality with the serious transport disasters that followed. 
Both prosecutions initiated in respect of Southall67 and Hatfield68 crumbled for the same 
reason as P&O - that the directing mind and will test acted as a ‘legal barrier to potential 
corporate criminal liability’.69 The fact that they were successfully prosecuted under the Health 
and Safety at Work Act 1974 made little difference, with most taking the view that it ‘is not a 
suitable response in the most serious cases’70; there being a ‘dichotomy of status and function 
between criminal and regulatory law’.71 Ultimately, such events, increased public and 
legislative awareness of the unsatisfactory legal framework, which handed large 
organisations, who ‘tend[ed] to breed the conditions for disaster’,72 immunity. In doing so, 
reform was ‘catapulted on to the political agenda’.73 
 
                                                     
60 Field, S., and Jones, L., ‘Death in the workplace: who pays the price?’ (2011), Company Lawyer, 
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71 R v Great Western Trains Co Ltd, Central Criminal Court, 30 June 1999 (unreported) 
72 Wells, C., ‘The Southall rail crash: testing the tracks of corporate manslaughter,’ (1999), Archbold 
News, vol.7, 3. 
73 Clarkson, C.M.V., ‘Corporate manslaughter: yet more Government proposals,’ (2005), Criminal Law 
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A proposed offence of corporate killing 
Reforming the law ‘has been driven by a public and media perception of injustice following the 
Crown’s failure to achieve criminal convictions’74 in disasters. The process, was initiated by 
two Law Commission Papers. The first75 reviewed the law on corporate manslaughter, and, 
the second,76 of pivotal importance here, proposed a new offence of corporate killing.77 The 
Law Commission found the identification principle to be ‘inadequate’,78 but saw no ‘justification 
for applying to corporations a law of manslaughter which was different from the general law’.79 
Thus the favoured approach was to ‘apply the elements of the “individual” offence of killing by 
gross carelessness to corporations in principle, but in a form adapted to a corporate context’.80 
The elements of the individual offence are:  
(1) The defendants conduct caused the death; 
(2) The risk of death would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the 
circumstances, which the defendant was capable of appreciating; and 
(3) The defendants conduct fell far below what could reasonably be expected of him in 
the circumstances.81 
 
The adapted form made a company guilty if a death was caused by a management failure 
which fell far below what can be reasonably expected in the circumstances. In regards to the 
individual offence, the adaption: kept the first requirement, satisfying conduct in the way of a 
management failure; removed the second, as corporations are incapable of foreseeing or 
appreciating a risk; and retained the third, ensuring that ‘the offence would be confined to 
cases of very serious negligence’.82 It therefore, ‘rightly focuses on the failings of the company 
rather than…, on the acts or omissions of an individual within the company’.83 While the 
proposals were generally ‘well-received by commentators’,84 doubts remained. For example, 
Wells thought they were ‘daring and innovatory’,85 but recognised that ‘much more work 
need[ed] to be done’. Essentially, commentators were sceptical as to ‘what [was] on the other 
side of the edge’86 of the proposals. Unfortunately, this was not to be known until 10 years 
                                                     
74 Griffin, S., ‘Corporate manslaughter: a radical reform?’ (2007), Journal of Criminal Law, 
vol.71(2),151. 
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76 Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter, (Law Commission 
No.237, 1996). 
77 Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code, (1996), Part VIII.    
78 Ibid para.7.8.    
79 Law Commission, Criminal Law: Involuntary Manslaughter, (1994), para.5.73 .    
80 Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code, (1996), para.7.36   
81 Ibid para.8.2    
82 Ibid para.8.34   
83 Clarkson, ‘Corporate manslaughter: yet more Government proposals’, (2005), 682. 
84 Ibid. 
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later, when a draft Bill87 paved the way to the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act 2007.  
 
2  The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007  
The ten year gestation of the 2007 Act was a time of ‘wrangling, bartering, debate and delay’.88 
Its origin can be pinpointed to the Law Commission’s proposed offence of “corporate killing”.89 
After this, ‘the baton…passed to the Home Office [who] accepted that the current criminal law 
on corporate culpability was inadequate’.90 A White Paper91 was published in 2002 which 
reviewed and modified the Law Commission’s proposals including broadening the scope of 
potential defendants from ‘corporations’, to ‘undertakings92 (i.e. schools, hospital trusts, 
partnerships, as well as one or two person businesses). Not including unincorporated bodies 
‘could lead to an inconsistency of approach’ and ‘appear arbitrary’.93 The response was mainly 
negative. Sullivan labelled the proposal ‘simple and bold’ and considered a situation whereby 
proceedings were initiated against a sole trader, stating that it ‘will neither in form nor 
substance involve corporate liability – the liability imposed will be a personal liability’. 
Concluding that fines will be directly imposed on individuals which, ‘underscores the potential 
harshness of extending corporate killing’.94  
 
Another, proposed secondary liability on those who ‘substantially contributed to the 
undertaking in question’s corporate offence’.95 While the proposal, for some, ‘undeniably 
grasp[s] a major truth’ because targeting individuals has the greatest deterrent-effect,96 others 
were sceptical as to ‘individuals being reluctant’97 to take on senior positions. The alternative, 
was to disqualify directors who contributed to the management failure.98 It was, therefore, less 
controversial than the former, and what Johnson labelled an ‘innovative proposal’ which 
                                                     
87 See: https://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/hacdraftcmgovtresponsecm6755.pdf 
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94 Sullivan, B., ‘Corporate killing – some Government proposals,’ (2001), Criminal Law Review, 
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95 Home Office, Reforming the Law on Involuntary Manslaughter, para.3.4.13. 
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97 Edgar, A., ‘Corporate manslaughter is just around the corner,’ (2001), International Company and 
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adequately highlighted both organisational and individual failings.99 Ultimately, the general 
consensus was that the Government’s broader proposals ‘look[ed] sound in principle’.100 
 
Unfortunately, it was not until 2005 that the Government published a draft bill. In brief it added 
a ‘relevant duty of care’ requirement; the senior management test, and; a range of ‘statutory 
criteria’ for assessing whether a breach was gross.101 Simultaneously, it removed all individual 
liability - ‘perhaps the most controversial proposal’.102 Commentators generally embraced the 
Draft Bill but recognised that it was in some respects too limited.103 After a thorough analysis 
and some last minute amendments at Committee stage, a long overdue Bill was published in 
2006 which became the CMCHA 2007. For some, this delay is attributable to ‘the complexity 
of the law and the necessity for careful reflection’, however, ‘a more cynical explanation…is 
linked to political and economic considerations’.104  
 
2.1 Analysis of the CMCHA 2007 
The CMCHA 2007 came into force on 6 April 2008. Despite extensive consultation, it did not 
receive the most welcoming response. Gobert labelled the Act a ‘disappointment’; ‘limited in 
its vision and lacking imagination’.105 Sargeant contends it is an array of ‘artificial restrictions, 
limitations and qualifications’106 and Wells deems it an ‘over-complex offence…full of 
ambiguities and interpretative uncertainty’.107 Under s.1 a company will incur liability for 
corporate manslaughter, if the way in which its activities are managed or organised causes a 
death and is a gross breach of a relevant duty of care. The prevalent feature, in comparison 
to the common law (abolished under s.20), is the apparent change from individualistic to 
systemic fault. The offence ‘addresses a key defect in the law’108 by ‘afford[ing] a superior 
basis of liability’109 and thus fulfils its purpose. It represents ‘a quantum leap in legal 
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discourse’,110 in that the legislature has seemingly adopted a realist approach to what 
constitutes a corporation. Overall, Sargeant believes that ‘the introduction of the new offence 
based on organisational killing, should be seen as a desirable development’111 as it represents 
a malleable interpretation of the law. One would agree, if it were not for the various barriers 
that prevent successful convictions in practice.  One of these appears in s.17, requiring the 
consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions for all corporate manslaughter prosecutions. 
The risk here, is the potential to embed the fate of corporate liability into the political vacuum. 
This is because of the DPP’s duty to ‘report…on the discharge of their functions,… [which] the 
Attorney General lays…before Parliament’.112 Consequentially, where consent is withheld one 
‘may suspect that the DPP had been influenced by MP’s who in turn had been influenced by 
corporate lobbyists’.113 Ultimately, it tarnishes the transparency of justice and reaffirms the 
cynical view – corporate manslaughter is too closely linked to political and economic 
considerations.   
 
Gobert argues that the offence represents a ‘radical departure’from the identification doctrine, 
however, this is somewhat ‘subdued by the effect of [s.1(3)]’,114 which requires a substantial 
element of the breach to be found in the way in which senior management organised or 
managed its activities. It is this, ‘disastrous’115 artificial barrier, which was the ‘most widely 
criticised aspect’.116  By referring directly to persons, the Act portends to ‘return the focus…to 
the evaluation of the relative contribution of…individuals’117 as opposed to the systemic 
failings of the corporation. Thus, many have argued that it ‘perpetuate[s] the same evidentiary 
stumbling blocks that frustrated prosecutions under the identification doctrine’118 and may 
retain a ‘disproportionate effect on smaller companies’.119 On the contrary, there is support for 
the fact that ‘the actual circle of people included in the…definition of senior management is 
likely to be much wider than…the ‘controlling minds’’120 and that persons as opposed to person 
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‘suggests an aggregation principle is applied…making the task of satisfying the elements of 
the test easier’.121 The extent to which ‘senior management’ has allowed large complex 
companies to escape convictions, is discussed later but it can be concluded that this is a 
‘worrying consequence that could render the CMCHA obsolete’.122  
 
The second issue, is who is deemed as ‘senior management’? s.1(4)(c), refers to persons 
who play significant roles in making decisions about, or the actual management, of the whole 
or a substantial part of its activities. The definition is, a linguistic conundrum, which is ‘unduly 
restrictive and threatens to open the door to endless argument…as to whether certain 
persons…constitute senior managers’.123 Notably, there have been attempts to add clarity. 
Wells, suggests that since ‘substantial’ is supplemented by ‘the whole’ it suggests ‘that it 
means something close to the whole if not the whole itself’124 as opposed to the narrower de 
minimis meaning enshrined in the criminal law. The CPS propose it is ‘likely to be limited to 
those whose involvement is influential and will not include those who simply carry out the 
activity’.125 Despite these attempts, ‘we are ultimately left without guidance’.126 Unfortunately, 
we are still no closer to understanding the senior management test, or its effects. Prosecutions 
have largely resulted in guilty pleas or have concerned small companies. The justification for 
ensuring that the offence, ‘targeted…failings in the strategic management of an organisation’s 
activities, rather than failing at relatively junior levels’,127 is outweighed by the need to create 
a level playing field between diverse enterprises. It can, therefore, be regarded as a 
‘disappointing compromise’.128 Both Clarkson and the Joint Committee, were right to point out 
that the earlier Law Commission’s proposal, which merely required a “management failure”, 
‘was preferable’.129 
  
Relevant duty of care 
A company must owe the deceased a relevant duty of care (s.1(1)(b)). Duties are established 
under the civil law of negligence but are limited by an exhaustive list in s.2; i.e. those owed as 
an employer and occupier of premises. Essentially, the Act ‘seeks to overlay existing legal 
obligations with the additional threat of criminal proceedings’.130 The problem, is that the civil 
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and criminal law have juxtaposing purposes and their rules cannot be so simply transferred.131 
Consequently, trying to adapt the civil law duties, which ‘provides ample opportunity 
for…legalistic pedantry’,132 to the criminal law, leaves us with an over complex task allowing 
defendants to ‘detour on…time-consuming and likely contentious disputes on issue[s] of 
dubious relevance’.133 The only advantage is that it is a question of law, and so concerns 
around complexity may be circumvented. Considering legal and natural persons are already 
under a duty not to kill, the ‘superior’134 approach, would be the Law Commission’s proposal 
to merely consider whether the corporation was a cause of death.135  
 
Causation 
The Act states that the management failure must cause the death (s.1(1)(a)) and that senior 
management must have substantially contributed (s.1(3)); it leaves the causation element 
‘curiously under-defined’.136 The idea being that ‘the usual principles of causation in the 
criminal law…apply’.137 Considering these are well established, Menis argues that ‘from a 
doctrinal point of view, there should be no problem’,138 especially since ‘the management 
failure need not have been the sole cause of death; it need only be a cause’.139 Nevertheless, 
others argue that ‘causation is fraught with problems’.140 As Ormerod and Taylor recognise, 
there is still scope for  ‘the organisation [to]  argue that employees’ free deliberate informed 
fatal acts breaks the chain of causation’,141 which can be seen in the first case brought under 
the Act: ‘it was…the deceased who had acted in breach of the company's system of work.’ 142  
Consequently, prosecutions may result in ‘…a much closer examination of the conduct of 
individuals at quite the other end of the chain of seniority’.143 Ultimately, causation ‘is 
[at]…centre stage under the 2007 Act’144 and so in depth arguments about whether it is  
established are to be expected particularly given the grave nature of the offence.   
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The fault element 
It is important to note that the Act will not bite for every single breach of duty - only ‘the most 
serious management failings warrant the application of a…criminal offence’.145  The breach 
must have been ‘gross’ i.e. ‘falls far below what can reasonably be expected of the 
organisation in the circumstances’ (s.1(4)(b)). Considering this definition is not ‘sufficiently 
clear’146 and the common law one is circular – ‘so bad in all the circumstances…that it should 
be judged as criminal’ – certain questions are left unanswered. What is the reasonable 
standard? How far below the standard constitutes gross? And whose conduct can be taken 
into account? Gobert argues ‘to an extent [these]…are addressed in s.8 of the Act’,147 which 
provides factors for the jury to consider, Wells disagrees stating ‘these seem to complicate 
rather than clarify’.148  
 
The first compulsory factor, is the organisation’s non-compliance with health and safety 
legislation (s.8(2)). Applying this to the test, will the reasonable standard of compliance ‘be of 
a universal standard applicable to companies of a similar size or…industry?’149 If so, there is 
the potential for ‘an across-the-board lowering of industry standards’.150 Further, in relation to 
how far below the reasonable standard equates to a gross breach, ‘are companies…expected 
to expend more energy and income on installing and maintaining a first-class health and safety 
regime or will economic circumstances dictate [otherwise]’? which, again, will allow for 
detraction from health and safety compliance. Lastly, given that ‘a significant connection is 
required between the gross failure…and the senior management of the organisation’,151 a 
further concern is whether the jury will be able to aggregate the actions of junior members with 
senior management. If they can, then, ‘the difficulty…will lie in piecing together the ‘jigsaw’ of 
blameworthiness’.152 In light of these ambiguities, Wells’ view that s.8 causes more confusion 
rather than clarification, is well-founded.  
 
Additionally, under s.8(3) the jury may also consider the organisations ‘attitudes, policies, 
systems or accepted practices’ and relevant health and safety guidance. The issue with the 
former, is that, a consideration of the company’s culture, with particular regard to their health 
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and safety record, could create a ‘danger…that the “reasonable standard” test will be made 
subject to mitigating factors’.153 So, whilst the breach may fall far below the reasonable 
standard, an excellent record of compliance could encourage the jury to find against corporate 
liability. In terms of the latter, the argument is that ‘guidance was not designed to have legal 
force and should not be used to establish criminal liability’.154  
 
2.2 Practical or symbolic?  
In light of these criticisms the Act’s practical purpose to ‘secure in a wider range of cases a 
conviction’,155 needs to be reviewed.  The Regulatory Impact Assessment estimated ‘between 
10–13 additional prosecutions a year’,156 so by now there should have been in excess of 100 
prosecutions. To date, although ‘an avalanche of cases was never expected’157 there has 
been only 25 convictions and three acquittals. Compared to the 137 deaths recorded by the 
HSE in 2016/17,158 and the fact that the ‘total ranks highly in comparison with virtually all other 
recorded causes of premature death in the UK’,159 elucidates the Act’s prosecutorial failings. 
Its commencement order has been a means of justifying the lack of prosecutions as only ‘acts, 
failures, decisions…that occurred’160 on or after 2008 qualified. Consequently, ‘it may well 
be…that the paucity of cases… is simply…the time-lag in its effect’,161 which ‘appears even 
more plausible when one notes that 12…convictions under the Act have been secured 
in…2015 and 2016’.162 The legitimacy of this justification has been doubted. In the House of 
Commons, Emily Thornberry MP questioned why there had been so few prosecutions under 
the CMCHA 2007. The Attorney General, Dominic Grieve, responded there were ‘in the region 
of 50 cases where corporate manslaughter is one of the potential offences under 
consideration’.163 Further, a Freedom of Information Request to the CPS in November 2012 
revealed that, since coming into force, 152 cases had been referred under the Act and that 
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‘there are currently 74 cases under review’.164 Considering that, four years later the CPS have 
only ‘33 cases under active consideration’,165 the prediction of a ‘simple accumulation or 
upwards trajectory of cases over time’,166 is evidentially misconceived.  
 
One would think that after 10 years in force, we could now discern trends and practices that 
have occurred in the Act’s application but so far, out of the 25 convictions, 16 have comprised 
guilty pleas and virtually all of the cases have involved small companies. Consequently, not 
only does this leave the ‘“senior management” test unchallenged’167but represents a serious 
deficiency in ‘facilitat[ing] the prosecution of medium and larger organisations’.168 In other 
words, ‘the vast majority of cases brought under the new law could have succeeded under 
common law’.169 Ultimately, we still await a ‘sufficiently complex [case] to test the capacity of 
the new attribution mechanisms’.170 The Grenfell disaster, if prosecuted, will bring such an 
impetus. However, until those ‘prosecutions ensue…much remains speculative’.171 For now, 
Almond and Colover’s observation, that the Act is ‘conservative in form and is unlikely 
fundamentally to change’172 the law, remains credible.  
 
Nevertheless, numerous scholarly articles on the subject, have tended to balance the Act’s 
practical shortcomings, on the one hand, with its ‘symbolic significance’173 on the other. Gobert 
points out that its symbolic significance ‘may ultimately transcend its methodological 
deficiencies’,174 because ‘it signifies that companies…are not above the law and are capable 
of committing crimes as grave as manslaughter’. In essence, the threat of being prosecuted 
for a “real” crime, ‘should…lead to greater attention being paid to the calculus of risk 
management decisions, with higher priority…given to health and safety’.175 However, given 
137 workplace deaths occurred 2016/17176 ‘vastly understates those killed by work’,177 
suggesting that such symbolic deterrence was overstated. Almond and Colover argue that 
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symbolism ‘provides a degree of reassurance and control, but this is undercut by a 
fundamental commitment to the maintenance of a functioning capitalist economy’.178 In other 
words, the Act works as a ‘confidence trick’,179 inducing ‘a sense of complacency that 
something has…been done to improve safety levels when no improvement has actually 
occurred’.180 Ultimately, the Act is complementary to a neo-liberal climate, where enforcement 
and investigation into work-place deaths is seen as an ‘unjustified intervention into natural, 
efficient, free markets and thus as something to be avoided.’181 
 
Inadequate enforcement   
So far, the discussion has concentrated on the Act’s shortcomings but its enforcement has 
also ‘become an increasingly high-profile issue’.182 The police, HSE and the CPS are all 
subject to the Work-related death protocol of liaison,183 which determines that the primacy of 
the investigation lies with the police. Whether the police are suited to such a task is 
questionable. Grimes, contends that, ‘the lack of cases to date is…the result of those with 
responsibility to investigate and prosecute lacking the necessary resources, co-ordination and 
training’.184 The police are ‘instinctively drawn towards establishing the immediate cause’,185 
which deflects focus from being concentrated on systemic failings. Essentially, this change of 
investigatory technique marks ‘a considerable departure from their normal responsibilities of 
investigating serious personal crime’,186 and demonstrates a potential reason as to why the 
corporate defendant, so far, has predominantly been small companies. This is exacerbated, 
by the budgetary cuts of the HSE whose ‘resources have been reduced by successive 
governments’,187 and the willingness of the CPS to prosecute ‘only the safest cases’.188 These 
deficiencies combined, creates an opportunity for corporate giants to abuse the system. Thus, 
the CMCHA will is only effective, if ‘the prosecuting authorities are willing to make use of the 
new offence’.189 
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3   The Obstacles of the CMCHA 2007  
Medium/large companies escaping conviction 
The failure of the identification doctrine was fundamentally linked to its individualistic focus; it 
being harder to identify individuals in larger, complex, companies. That same focus, is 
recognised, albeit with a modernised face, in the CMCHA. It is suggested that the senior 
management test operates as a façade, behind which the ‘identification principle still 
dominates the corporate manslaughter regime’.190 The test requires that senior management 
must be a substantial element in the breach (s.1(3)). The modernised face appearing in the 
plural “senior management”, as opposed to “senior manager”. The significance being, that 
corporate liability would seemingly be satisfied by ‘an aggregation of decision making’,191 as 
opposed to identifying one culpable individual under the former regime. It can be viewed as 
superior to the identification doctrine, as it makes ‘the task of satisfying the elements of the 
test easier’.192 
 
However, even if an aggregation element would slightly improve the law from its predecessor, 
the test still emanates serious deficiencies in prosecuting large corporations. Firstly, the senior 
management requirement places a ‘reliance upon individuals as proxies for organisations, and 
with individual fault as a proxy for organisational culpability’.193 Finding corporate liability 
through aggregation, still requires finding fault in individuals in the first place. Applied to multi-
layered organisations, where ‘individual actors are hidden under corporate shrouds’,194 the 
prospect of convictions remains doubtful. Hence why Gobert, found the Act to be 
‘regressive’.195 This judicial relapse on individual focus, can be observed in cases decided 
under the Act so far; although, it is accepted that the latter has comprised of small companies: 
• Geotechnical Holdings Ltd196 The company was convicted because the victims 
death, ‘…was caused by the gross breach by the company, acting through its 
Managing Director Mr Eaton’.  
• J Murray & Son Ltd197The company was convicted on the basis that the controlling 
director, ‘personally devised and directed the operations at…[the] mixing plant’ which 
led to a death.  
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• Pyranha Mouldings Ltd198 During the sentencing of the company, the judge made ‘it 
clear that the whole purpose of the sentences…is to punish the directors who are 
responsible for the state of affairs that led to this fatal accident’.199  
 
The senior management test, by continuing to rely on individuals, ‘may simply reproduce the 
failings of the common law offence it replaced’.200 The law remains ignorant to the fact that 
‘the larger the company, the greater the confusion over responsibility’201 and so identifying the 
senior management, much like the directing mind and will, remains elusive. Indeed, the only 
element working to soften the blow, is that culpability need not be found in one person, but 
aggregated over many thus the CMCHA represents an ‘expanded form of the identification 
doctrine’.202 
 
The possibility of aggregating individual fault, begs the question, which individuals can be 
included? Unfortunately, the ‘senior management’ definition, ‘those making decisions about, 
or actually managing, the whole or a substantial part of the organisation’s activities (s.1(4)(c)), 
fails to provide detail on whether middle or junior levels, carrying out such activities under 
delegation would be incorporated. If they are not, then, as the Centre for Corporate 
Accountability has pointed out, ‘an incentive could exist for directors to…delegate 
responsibility’.203 Tariq, labelling such levels as ‘scapegoats’, agrees, stating ‘this restriction 
would fit perfectly into the palms of senior management’.204 Though this remains untested 
under the Act, the likelihood of the judiciary taking a broad approach, so as to include other 
management levels, ‘is discouragingly dim’.205 Some argue that this issue has been 
circumvented, at least to some degree, by s.19. This allows for additional proceedings under 
the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. The positive is that liability is established ‘without any 
requirement to prove a senior manager’s failure’206 and thus, the immunity that large 
companies appear to enjoy under the CMCHA diminishes. Nevertheless, the HSWA fails to 
provide a practical alternative in many respects. Field and Jones contend that prosecuting 
‘through this channel may not satisfy public demand’.207 The Act makes no distinction between 
non-fatal and fatal accidents, so when a fatality does occur, the public response is that a 
‘“mere” health and safety breach’208 has occurred, as opposed to condemning the company 
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as a “corporate killer”. This ‘breach of fair labelling’, was only intensified by the ‘failure to 
extend the criminal label’209 in the major disasters previously discussed, causing the HSWA 
to suffer a ‘legitimatory deficit’.210 Furthermore, the HSWA is enforced by the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) who adopts a ‘compliance strategy and prefers advice and assistance to 
companies over prosecution’;211 a “law as a last resort” approach. Consequently, prosecution 
is only brought in ‘some 20 % of cases where death has occurred at work’.212 Clearly, then, 
the HSWA is not an appropriate “back-up” to prosecuting large companies which escape the 
CMCHA. 
 
Recent suggestions are that we may now be experiencing ‘a more diverse corporate 
defendant’213 in light of the successful prosecution against CAV Aerospace Ltd,214 a medium-
large company, with a complex management structure. Although, prima facie, this is to be 
welcomed as a ‘triumph over all the potential barriers to conviction’,215 the fact that there was 
evidentiary correspondence showing a senior manager’s disregard for safety, perhaps 
suggests the case was not the long awaited challenge to the CMCHA that so many hoped it 
would be. Arguments that ‘now we have had a conviction of a large company, accusations 
that the Act is impotent…appear less tenable’216 must be doubted. This is especially so, 
considering the decision, even after three years, remains isolated. Nevertheless, it is certainly 
plausible to conclude that the law is moving in the right direction. R v Maidstone and Tunbridge 
Wells NHS Trust is noteworthy. Firstly, it being an NHS Trust is ‘“ground-breaking’217 in itself, 
secondly, the judge decided that rather than having to stipulate specific individuals, it is 
sufficient that the court identify the lowest “tier” of management whose culpability will 
qualify.218 It is, hoped that ‘the opaqueness of the senior management test has potentially 
been clarified’219 affording judges greater knowledge on how to interpret and apply it to larger 
companies. For now, the question of whether the net of ‘corporate liability under the CMCHA 
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may be expanding’220 remains elusive; it being, ‘an ugly hybrid of individualist corporate liability 
and acceptance of organisational culpability’.221  
 
Punishment 
A fine is the predominant punishment for corporate manslaughter. Under the common law, 
such punishment proved disappointing: fines ‘approximated in a range of £4,000 to 
£90,000’.222 It is, therefore, no wonder why the CMCHA, threatening an unlimited fine (s.1(6)), 
and the 2010 Definitive Guidelines223 emphasising ‘punitive and severe penalties’,224 are to 
be ‘welcomed at their inception’.225 The Guidelines advocate that fines will ‘seldom be less 
than £500,000’ and ‘may be measured in millions of pounds’. In reaching such figures, the 
courts are required to assess the seriousness of the offence and any aggravating or mitigating 
features, before turning to the company’s financial position. Although statute advises that fines 
should be at a level which the defendant is capable of paying, the Guidelines recognise that 
in the gravest cases, putting the company out of business may be an appropriate 
consequence.226 The Guidelines bark but the extent to which this is turned into bite, can only 
be measured through a reflection of their application in cases so far. 
 
The first case R v Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings Ltd resulted in a £350,000 fine. Although 
this falls short of the minimum threshold, the company’s financial position was ‘parlous’; the 
fine representing 116% of its turnover.227 The judge recognised the possibility of liquidation, 
stating that while it is ‘unfortunate’, it is ‘unavoidable’. 228  Thus, initially, the guidelines 
appeared to send a strong message that fines reflect the severity of the offence. This 
momentum was short-lived. A series of cases that followed Cavendish Masonry Ltd229 and 
JMW Farms230 resulted in fines of £150,000 and £187,500 respectively. Not only is this a 
significant departure from the threshold, but of greater concern, represents the courts’ attitude 
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to prioritise ‘the adverse financial impact of a hefty fine on the defendant’,231 over ensuring 
sentences are punitive and sufficient, in effect keeping companies solvent. Ironically, this 
fixation on financial viability has resulted in ‘widely varying fines for similar offences’.232 During 
the Guideline’s consultation process, various interest groups petitioned for a 2.5-10% 
correlation between fines and turnover,233 in order ‘to have an equal economic impact on 
organisations of different sizes’.234 The Sentencing Guidelines Council rejected such 
proposals, arguing that the circumstances of the defendant and the financial impact of the fine 
will vary too much and could provide ‘a perverse incentive to manipulation of corporate 
structure’.235 The SGC initiated ‘a wholesale review’236 in a 2014 consultation paper to form 
‘an approach to sentencing, that more closely links the means of the offender – alongside the 
seriousness of the offence – to the final sentence’. 237 The renewed Guidelines,238 effective 
from 1 February 2016, require the court to focus on the annual turnover of the company to set 
a proportionate range and starting point. For medium and large-sized organisations £3 million 
and £7.5 million respectively. If we were to apply this to CAV Aerospace,239 whose turnover 
was in excess of £100 million, there would have been potential for a £20 million fine to be 
levied, as opposed to the mediocre £600,000 imposed. Equally, the range is broader, reducing 
the starting point for smaller organisations, a “micro organisation”,240 which would encapsulate 
most of the companies prosecuted to date, would face a £300,000 starting point, which ‘may 
better reflect the realities of sentencing’.241 
 
In the seven cases the guidelines have been applied, six comprised micro-organisations: three 
resulted in £300,000 fines;242 two £500,000243 and one £600,000.244 Although the fines concur 
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with the relevant sentencing ranges, they still fail to reflect the level of culpability; each case 
was found to be a “category A” offence. For example, the case against SR and RJ Brown245 
resulted in a £300,000 fine, falling short of the £450,000 starting point, and in particular, the 
£800,000 maximum. Ultimately, ‘the courts appeared to be…more punitive, just not as punitive 
as they possibly could’.246 That is until Health and Safety Executive v Martinisation (London) 
Ltd,247 a small organisation deemed to have committed a category A offence, fined £1.2 million 
when two of its employees died while trying to haul a sofa onto a balcony. The relevant starting 
point was £800,000, the range £540,000–£2,800,000, appearing to ‘make the punishment fit 
the crime – or size of the offender’;248 a robust response to corporate manslaughter cases that 
has been long-awaited.  
 
This is merely one case and ‘it would seem premature to conclude that penalties of this 
magnitude will become the norm’.249 Fields argues that ‘the 2015 guidelines are not ideal, it 
still does not allow for organisations which are…turnover poor but asset rich’250 meaning there 
is still a gap for abuse. Furthermore, it is argued that the guidelines are not the appropriate 
means of reform, since they target imposing higher fines against large corporations once they 
have been convicted; the conviction itself continuing to elude the courts. While it is hoped that 
the approach taken in Martinisation will signify the way forward, for now, we can at least rely 
on the guidelines strong symbolic message, that ‘it will be cheaper to comply with the law than 
break it’;251 much like the CMCHA it accompanies. 
 
Plea bargaining 
The blinding paradox of the CMCHA, is that while the senior management test requires 
identifying culpable individuals, the Act explicitly excludes individual liability (s.18). This is 
‘possibly influenced by…the CBI and Institute of Directors’,252 who only showed ‘vociferous 
support for a change in corporate manslaughter law’253 once s.18 was added. This does not 
mean that individuals enjoy complete immunity from prosecution, they may still be prosecuted 
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for gross negligence manslaughter or s.37 of the HSWA, if they have consented to the offence 
or their negligence is attributable to it. The difficulty with this, is that it results in a ‘plethora of 
potential charges…arising from the same death’,254 which in turn creates a dynamic for plea 
bargains. Guidance suggests that the prosecution should only accept pleas, where the 
sentence ‘matches the seriousness of the offending’, and must never do so just ‘because it is 
convenient’. 255 In practice this is rarely abided by. Consequently, the liability of individuals, no 
matter how severe, ‘is absorbed by the liability of the corporation’.256 This is problematic, since 
it was the Government who recognised that ‘without punitive sanctions against company 
officers, the proposed new offence might not provide a sufficient deterrent’.257 
 
One of the most notable cases in which plea bargaining occurred was Lion Steel Equipment 
Ltd. The company and three of its directors were charged with corporate manslaughter and 
gross negligence manslaughter respectively, after an employee carrying out maintenance 
work on a roof fell to his death. Interestingly, the judge severed the corporate manslaughter 
charge because, ‘a joint trial would have required directions to the jury of baffling 
complexity’.258  Yet when the trial for the common law offences ensued ‘the two individual 
directors…plea bargained their personal liability by accepting guilt on behalf of the corporate 
body’.259 In other words, Lion Steel ‘pleaded guilty to corporate manslaughter even though it 
was not on trial for that offence at the time’.260 What is more, not only did those involved escape 
liability, but the prospect of individuals being prosecuted in the future was diminished when 
the Judge laid out the height of the bar to be grappled with in cases of gross negligence 
manslaughter.261 Since this case, plea bargaining has become the “norm”, which may explain 
why out of the 25 cases brought under the Act, 16 have consisted of guilty pleas. Generally, 
plea bargaining is used as a mechanism to “fast-forward” proceedings.262 However, there are 
two lines of reasoning as to why it has become such a regularity under the CMCHA. Firstly, it 
is suggested that this is a coercive tool adopted by the prosecution. Morrison, Hunt and Ollier 
recognise that when directors are charged with common law manslaughter, which can lead to 
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life imprisonment, they are made to feel ‘sufficiently vulnerable’263 so that any opportunity to 
evade such liability is welcomed. The benefit for the prosecution, is that while they exert 
pressure on defendants, they relieve their own. As Pizzi identifies, if the CPS cannot trust their 
‘trial apparatus… to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent, it needs to find a way to avoid 
trial’,264 prosecutors are using directors as the “bait” of corporate manslaughter convictions.265 
Alternatively, it may be directors instigating this agreement. After all, it is in their personal 
interests to evade liability, their ‘initiative is ‘to offer a corporate guilty plea in the hope or 
knowledge that any individual liability will be dropped with the added “bonus” of a reduction in 
any subsequent fine’.266 This is problematic, since directors have a fiduciary duty to ‘promote 
the success of the company for the benefit of its members’ and part of that, entails a 
consideration of the effects of decision-making in the long-term.267 Clearly, the decision to 
trade a guilty plea of corporate manslaughter, for personal immunity, does not align with this 
duty and could ‘potentially expose [directors] to future civil action’.268  
 
4  Overcoming Obstacles to the CMCHA 2007  
 
Reform to make medium and large corporations accountable 
To comprehend an holistic regime of liability 269 one must recognise companies as ‘free-
standing entities, culpable for their own policies, procedures and systems’.270 On 6 March 
1987, the Herald of Free Enterprise capsized killing 193 passengers and crew. An 
investigation271 found the assistant bosun, who failed to shut the bow doors, to be the 
immediate cause. But a far greater contributory factor lay in the systemic failings of the 
corporation ‘from top to bottom the body corporate was infected with the disease of 
sloppiness’.272 The structure of managerial roles, or lack of, meant that duties were left unclear 
resulting in senior management failing to exert directions in respect of specific functions and 
an absence of any clear lines of communication. Clearly, the behaviour of ‘individuals…will 
never fully explain corporate culpability [and] organisations will always add an additional 
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dimension’.273 The focus here is finding culpability within that additional dimension, i.e. the 
company’s system.  
 
Corporate structure, is the formal framework established to promote corporate goals, or 
overcome corporate pressures.274 It does so, by acting as a “system of control”, spanning 
across: planning objectives, establishing standards of performance, monitoring actual 
performance, comparing achievement with targets, and taking corrective action.275 So, if a 
company’s objective is to maximise profits, it may focus on increased productivity at the 
expense of health and safety. For example, in R v Sterecycle (Rotherham) Ltd,276 an employee 
was killed due to ‘dangerous operating practices…[being] allowed to develop under 
commercial pressure’.277 If Sterecycle was a larger company, increased productivity would 
have been achieved through their internal structure. Those more senior in the hierarchy, would 
introduce a set of incentives ‘to increase the likelihood that individuals will behave in desired 
ways’.278 Thus, the corporate structure ‘coerces compliance with corporate goals or aims’;279 
why Price labels it a ‘psychic prison’. Alternatively, returning to the situation in P&O, the 
company may be structured in a way where roles are disjointed and isolated, so that 
responsibility for criminogenic activities remains elusive. Though, this may have evaded 
derivative schemes of liability, under this holistic approach, the very fact that the company has 
been organised in such a manner and failed to avert foreseeable risks, would render the 
company liable. Additionally, it is suggested that corporate intentionality will be borne out of 
the company’s policies. These are an expression of the corporate will, representing ‘a 
synthesis of views or a compromise of views’.280 For a safe system of work, Gobert argues 
that it is ‘the company’s responsibility to collect information regarding potential dangers…, 
collate the data, and implement policies which will prevent reasonably foreseeable risks from 
occurring’.281 Policies to the contrary, which encourage risk taking, should be condemned as 
a breach of duty by the company and provide evidence that liability should arise. Not all 
companies operate under a formalised structure, with clearly expressed procedures and 
policies, it is just as common for companies to operate within its ‘informal practices [than]…in 
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its official decisions’,282 or to ‘create a climate which discourages obedience to known rules’.283 
It is argued here, that a lack of policy, shows just as much about a company’s attitude towards 
safety than a flawed one and that a disregard for known rules, would give a greater indicator 
that the company fell far below what is reasonably expected of them in the circumstances.  
 
A company which transgresses the law, would have the defence of due diligence. The burden 
of proof lies with the company, to prove their system of work ensured safeguards against a 
risk of death. The practicality of such a defence is two-fold. Firstly, it would limit the offence to 
that which is inherently corporate and encourage the courts to make a distinction between the 
‘corrupt organisation’, and the ‘organisation of corrupt individuals’.284 Secondly, it would 
ensure greater compliance with health and safety legislation, since the only possibility of 
escaping conviction, is to demonstrate that ‘stringent procedures to combat illegal activity’285 
were in place. A move away from the individualistic criminal law, to a more systemic approach 
is favourable. The evidentiary problems inherent in the former will be ousted, as the courts will 
no longer have to ‘attempt to squeeze corporate square pegs into the round hole of criminal 
law doctrines’.286 Empirical evidence has shown that large companies are more likely to have 
formalised structures and rules in response to their diffused management systems.287 Thus, 
under this reform, size will no longer dominate liability.   
 
Increasing the level of fines 
Punishment is ‘the skeleton of the criminal justice system’288 and encourages compliance with 
accepted standards of behaviour. The 2015 Guidelines aims to achieve this, by levying fines 
that ‘bring home to management and shareholders the need to achieve a safe environment 
for workers and members of the public affected by their activities’.289 Its object is ‘the removal 
of gain derived through the…offence and the reduction of offending through deterrence’.290 To 
some extent, the new guidelines are a significant step in the right direction. The average fine 
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has increased from £251,138 to £528,571.291 Health and Safety Executive v Martinisation 
(London) Ltd292 resulted in the highest fine to be executed under the Act yet. Thus, the 
willingness of the judiciary to utilise the guidelines to their fullest extent is improving. Having 
said that, their primary purpose was to ensure that ‘fines on larger organisations were fulfilling 
the purposes of sentencing’;293 hence, the ‘ramping up’294 of fines at the top end. Given that 
the ‘apparent invulnerability of larger organisations to prosecution’295 has yet to be rectified, it 
is difficult to quantify just how effective these new guidelines will turn out to be.  
 
It is notable that the CMCHA was implemented to ‘complement, not replace, other forms of 
redress such as prosecutions under health and safety legislation’.296 Since the latter is also 
covered by the 2015 guidelines, and has been more accessible for prosecuting large 
companies, it may be possible to glean some indications as to the judicial approach when 
applying them. Encouragingly, prior to the implantation of the Guidelines, ‘fines had already 
started to dramatically increase’.297 For example, Total E&P UK Ltd298 were fined £1.125 
million following a gas leak and Balfour Beatty299  £1 million for a road worker’s death. Better 
yet, in 2016/17 – the first full year with the Guidelines in operation – the total amount of fines 
reached £69.9 million, a huge increase from the £38.8 million recorded the previous year.300 
What is pivotal, is the size of the organisations being captured. One illustration, is the case 
against Merlin Attractions,301 where 16 people were injured on one of its rollercoasters. The 
corporate giant showed an annual turnover of £385,000,000 and was sentenced to a fine of 
£7,500,000 reduced to £5,000,000 for an early guilty plea; this being ‘greater than the 
prescribed range for this specific type of offence’.302 Beyond this, there has been ‘more fines 
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of £1m or more, than in the previous 20 years’.303 One potential deficiency is the absence of 
any reference to the company’s assets when considering the impact of ‘other financial factors’ 
on the fine,304 which could prevent fines from being proportionate. Currently, the process for 
calculating fines begins with determining the seriousness of the offence;  consideration of the 
company’s annual turnover to decide the appropriate starting point and range and then other 
financial factors to ensure proportionality with the overall means of the offender. Such factors 
include the profitability of the company, economic benefits derived from the offence and 
whether it could put the company out of business.305 Since the company’s assets do not 
directly fit into any of the above, it is suggested that an additional factor be added into the final 
step 3 along the lines of:  
An organisation’s net assets will be a relevant factor where they enhance an 
organisation’s value to such an extent, that merely considering turnover would 
improperly reflect their ability to pay a fine. 
 
 If a company, based on turnover, was categorised as ‘micro’, yet had a considerable amount 
of assets, the court should consider an upwards adjustment. ‘Assets’ are defined by the 
International Financial Reporting Standards as, ‘a resource controlled by the enterprise as a 
result of past events and from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the 
enterprise’.306 They may be categorised into current assets – short-term economic resources 
which can easily be converted into cash or fixed assets – long-term resources such as land 
or buildings. By way of illustration, in Pyranha Mouldings Ltd, a manufacturer of kayaks was 
fined £200,000 for the death of one of its employees. It enjoyed total audit exemption, 
suggesting the company was ‘micro’. The court believed that any higher fine ‘could not be 
absorbed without the risk of driving the company into liquidation’. 307 Nevertheless, its net 
assets at the end of 2014 totalled £1,015,771 a large part comprising current assets easily 
convertible into cash, it is suggested the fine would not ‘inflict painful punishment’ as it should.  
 
There are those who argue that fines are not an appropriate form of punishment. Tombs 
objects to fines on the basis that they do not aid rehabilitation, deflect money from being spent 
on developing safer systems andare counter-productive since it is typically the innocent 
(employees and customers) that end up worse off – what is known as “overspill”.308 From a 
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different perspective, Forlin raises the concern that with higher fines, businesses may be 
persuaded to either scale down their operations309 or move them outside of the UK.310  
Contrary to these views, the opinion here is that the CMCHA, through fines, remedial311 and 
publicity orders,312 does impose the correct channel of punishment against corporations. In 
response to Tombs it is suggested that remedial orders ensure that safer systems are adopted 
and the focus on turnover in the renewed guidelines minimises the risk of overspill. For Forlin, 
it is unlikely that the risk of a fine would drive large businesses to move their operations or 
scale down, when a far-cheaper and efficient alternative is to merely adopt a safer working 
system. In fact, the argument here is that if fines were reduced, companies would perceive 
them as ‘calculable, rational risk[s] to take as a cost of doing business’.313  
 
Individual liability  
So how should the Act make scope for personal liability? A good starting point is to refer back 
the Act’s thorny consultation process where individual liability was a reality. In 2000 the Home 
Office proposed that any individual who could be shown to have had ‘some influence on, or 
responsibility for’ the offence should be subject to disqualification,314or if they have 
‘substantially contributed’ to it, subjected to the harsher penalty of imprisonment.315 Although, 
the inclusion of personal liability is to be welcomed, it is suggested that having two separate 
strands of secondary liability would add more confusion to an Act that is already ‘over-
complex’.316 A better alternative would be to adopt something akin to s.37 HSWA. If the 
offence has been committed ‘with the consent or connivance of, or to have been attributable 
to any neglect’ of those persons named above, they shall incur secondary liability. Clearly, 
with the individualistic attitude adopted under the Act so far and the concentration of cases 
against small companies, there would be little difficulty in satisfying these requirements; 
especially when in some cases it has been the director themselves at fault. Nevertheless, this 
proposal needs to complement the systemic reform already discussed. To do so, it is 
suggested that rather than imposing liability on persons for their direct actions to the death, 
liability would ensue from their involvement in a flawed corporate structure. 
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On the finding of guilt, it is suggested that individuals be disqualified and may be liable to 
imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine depending on the level of involvement and magnitude 
of harm caused. In respect of fines, it is suggested that the courts should review the 
remuneration that those in question were receiving in and around the time the offence was 
committed. If this is significantly high, the courts should be permitted to claw it back through 
an upwards adjustment of the fine to target “fat cat” directors who often tend to profit from their 
fatal shortcuts. Ultimately, incorporating personal liability into the CMCHA, and removing s.18 
will prevent individuals who are clearly clothed with culpability from abusing the corporate veil. 
Through such exposure, the Act will become an effective deterrent, as directors and other 
senior members will be conscious to avoid the looming threat of personal punishment. 
Additionally, it would prevent the occurrence of the ‘phoenix phenomenon’ which means that 
companies can essentially evade their liability by entering into liquidation and directors can 
simply regroup under a new entity.317 On the whole, it is suggested that a more systemic 
approach, harsher fines, and the inclusion of personal liability, will give the Act the grip it really 
needs to ensure that corporations stop ‘valuing deaths...as mere externalities’.318 
 
Conclusion  
Clearly, the CMCHA 2007 has not achieved what it set out to. Even after ten years, the case 
law gives a vibrant indication that the largest and most complex companies, which the Act 
intended to bring to account, remain unscathed.  The root of the problem, is that the Act’s 
‘senior management’ test maintains a focus on individualistic rather than systemic fault, 
meaning that companies prosecuted so far could have been successfully prosecuted under 
the identification doctrine. Ultimately, it would seem that the symbolic legislation is little more 
than a ‘fudged compromise’,319 which plays lip service to the public opprobrium while ensuring 
that relations are not vanquished with the business community. Despite this, recent cases, 
such as CAV Aerospace have appeared to signify a tougher rhetoric in applying the law.  While 
this is to be welcomed, it is far too premature to assume that this represents the way forward 
thus we await a challenge to accurately determine the fitness of the Act. 
 
This may be forthcoming, in light of the potential charges of corporate manslaughter following 
the recent tragedy at Grenfell Tower. On 14 June 2017, an electrical fire broke out on the 
fourth floor of a 24-storey tower block in North Kensington, killing 72 people. The flats, which 
were owned by Kensington and Chelsea London Borough Council, were reduced to a ‘charred 
                                                     
317 Gobert, ‘Thirteen years in the making but was it worth the wait?’ 426. 
318 Tombs, S., and Whyte, D., The Corporate Criminal: Why Corporations Must Be Abolished, 
(Routledge: London, 2015), 15. 
319 Roper, ‘A 10-year review,’ 50. 





skeleton’320 after fire rapidly engulfed the building.321  Initially, the overriding cause was 
pinpointed to the combustible cladding, which was applied during the 2014-16 refurbishment. 
It was found that a ‘more fire resistant cladding could have been supplied at the small cost of 
an additional £2 per square metre’.322 Nevertheless, the ongoing public inquiry has since 
revealed ‘serious deficiencies in the installation of the windows, cavity barriers’323 and fire 
doors, as well as poor safety management. Worryingly, therefore, fault spans across a range 
of local authorities and multi-national companies. This raises various challenges for the Act: 
can the senior management test finally stand up to large complex systems? Will it be possible 
to aggregate fault amongst a range of contributing companies, or, is merely being one of the 
causes of death enough? If so, how would this work with the criminal burden of proof, where 
a jury must be beyond reasonable doubt that the company caused the death? All of these 
questions will need to be carefully considered as the inquiry intensifies. If corporate 
manslaughter convictions are secured, then a safer and more promising future lies ahead 
where companies are no longer considered superior to the law. If they are not, then, the 
capability of the law will be seriously compromised and some major amendments will need to 
be immediately sought after. Based on the discussion throughout, the latter outcome is 
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